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RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS
HERITAGE IN THE MODERN WORLD:
U.S. LEGAL PROTECTION IN LIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations General Assembly has declared the dec-
ade from 1995 to 2004 the International Decade of the World's
Indigenous People.' The stated goal is "to strengthen interna-
tional cooperation for the solution of problems faced by indige-
nous people in such areas as human rights, the environment,
development, education and health."2 It is somewhat ironic
that in this era defined by progress and innovation, we have
turned our attention toward those minority populations whose
concerns lie not in advancement, but in tradition; not in pro-
gressing toward the future, but in keeping ties with their past.
Any number of factors are responsible for this development.
Perhaps it is the result of a growing realization that respect for
cultural differences is vital to fostering a cohesive global com-
munity. Perhaps it is simply that indigenous peoples have be-
gun to speak out louder than ever,3 and therefore have finally
grasped the attention of influential leaders in the international
community.
One area where indigenous peoples have attained relative
success is in instilling in the international community the im-
portance of protecting their cultural heritage. Namely, they
have called upon international lawmakers to work to prevent
"the widespread and growing threats to the integrity of their
cultural, spiritual, religious, artistic and scientific traditions
1. G.A. Res. 163, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/163 (1993).
The Decade's theme has been declared as: "Indigenous people: partnership in
action." Id.
2. Id.
3. See Lakschman Guruswamy et al., Protecting the Cultural and Natu-
ral Heritage: Finding Common Ground, 34 TULSA L.J. 713, 723-24 (1999).
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and values." Indigenous peoples have finally impressed upon
the world community the need to assist them in achieving self-
determination. 5 Arguably, that concept, a subclass of interna-
tional human rights law, encompasses the right of indigenous
peoples to repossess, or at least maintain control over, those
objects, sites or practices deemed vital to their distinct iden-
tity.6 Because indigenous heritage is an important "segment of
4. ERICA-IRENE DAES, PROTECTION OF THE HERITAGE OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE 5, U.N. Sales No. E.97. XIV.3 (1997).
5. See Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, adopted June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter
ILO Convention No. 1691. The term "self-determination" carries a number of
connotations:
"Self-determination"... can be neither defined nor opposed. It can
mean the right of people to choose their own form of government
within existing borders .... It can mean the right of an ethnic, lin-
guistic, or religious group to redefine existing national borders in or-
der to achieve separate national sovereignty. It can mean the right
of a political unit within a federal system ... to secede from the fed-
eration and become an independent sovereign state. Or it can
merely mean the right of an ethnic, linguistic, or religious group
within an existing sovereign state to a greater degree of autonomy
and linguistic or religious identity, but not to a sovereign state of its
own.
Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-emergence of Self
determination, and the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous
States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 211 (1999). It is this latter definition that cur-
rently prevails in most discussions of the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination. See Siegfried Wiessner & Marie Battiste, United Nation: The
2000 Revision of the United Nations Draft Principles and Guidelines on the
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 383,
386 (2000). Article 3 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples grants indigenous peoples the right to self-determination.
"By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Draft United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E.S.C. Res. 1994/45,
U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., 36th mtg., Annex I, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2,
E/CN.3/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541, 547 [hereinafter
Draft Declaration]. Article 4 clarifies this right further: "Indigenous peoples
have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, economic,
social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems, while re-
taining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural life of the State." Id. art. 4.
6. In his report on the right to own property, Special Rapporteur of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Luis Valencia Rodriguez, concludes: "The sense of security and dig-
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the DNA of our global community,"7 it is the responsibility of
the national and international legal communities to assist
them in their efforts to preserve and protect it.
There are four major international state-based agreements
devoted to this issue. For decades these conventions, along
with their significant shortcomings, were the only source of
international law regarding the protection of indigenous heri-
tage. The enormous growth of activity and consensus of the
international community surrounding this issue, however, can
be viewed as an emerging customary international law. Acts
taken on regional levels are evidence of general principles,
which contribute to international custom.
The United States was one of the first countries to develop a
comprehensive legislative scheme for the protection of the cul-
tural heritage of its indigenous peoples. The international
community, in drafting various resolutions toward the goal of
the proper protection of the heritage of indigenous peoples, has
nity gained from being able to own property is an essential prerequisite for
the pursuit of happiness and exercise of a variety of other human rights" and
is "related to all other human rights and fundamental freedoms." U.N.
ESCOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 7 9, U.N. Doc.:E/CN.4/1993/15 (1992).
7. Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 713. It also constitutes a rather
large segment of global heritage, there being some 300 million indigenous
people, including 5000 indigenous and tribal groups that spread among some
seventy countries. See Press Release, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the
Pacific, Indigenous People Still the Poorest of the Poor (Aug. 8, 2001), avail-
able at http.//www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkoklnewsroom/
pr0105.htm [hereinafter Press Release].
The following groups may be considered indigenous peoples (although
this list is by no means exclusive): in Europe there are the Celtic peoples of
the British Isles, Brittany in France and Galicia in Spain; the Basque peoples
of France, Portugal and Spain; and the Saami or Lapp people of Greenland,
Norway, Sweden, Finland and the former Soviet Union. In Asia there are the
tribal or hill peoples of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China; and the Ainu
people in Japan. There are numerous indigenous groups in Siberia, some of
whom are considered as part of the Inuit or Eskimo peoples, also present in
Alaska, Canada and western Greenland. In Africa, the Berbers and the San
or Bushmen may be considered as indigenous peoples. In Oceana there are
indigenous groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, Borneo and Papua New
Guinea. The Native Hawaiians also fit within Oceana. In Australia are the
Aboriginal peoples, and in New Zealand the Maori peoples. Steven C. Per-
kins, Researching Indigenous Peoples Rights Under International Law, at
http'//intelligent-internet.info/law/ipr2.html (1999).
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often looked to the U.S. for guidance.8 This Note will explore
the current U.S. policies toward protection of indigenous heri-
tage in light of emerging international custom. Ultimately it
will conclude that, while the U.S. was at one time in the fore-
front of this movement, it has begun to lose its footing. Part II
provides a historical context, defining key terms and examining
the economic and sociological rationales for protecting indige-
nous heritage. Part III looks at the four major state-based
treaties dedicated to protecting world cultural property. While
these agreements were an important force behind indigenous
peoples' claims to their heritage, they ultimately demonstrate
that such treaties inadequately serve their needs. Part III goes
on to argue that the recent callings of United Nations Working
Group on Indigenous Populations ("Working Group"), the In-
ternational Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concern-
ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
("ILO Convention No. 169") and regional efforts constitute an
international custom regarding the heritage of indigenous peo-
ples. Part IV lays out a set of principles that have emerged as
the basic framework for this custom, and then examines what
further action the United States must take, in order to conform
with those principles.
II. BACKGROUND
The definition of indigenous peoples adopted by the United
Nations is that of the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights,' ° Jose Martinez Cobo, in his Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations." He writes:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, con-
8. See generally DAES, supra note 4.
9. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 5.
10. See U.N. ESCOR, Agenda Item 15 10, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2 (1994). See also LYNDELL V. PROT, COMMENTARY ON
THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION 111 (1997).
11. JOSE MARTINEZ COBO, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, 1983, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1986).
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sider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies
now prevailing in thoge territories, or parts of them. They
form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are de-
termined to preserve, develop and transmit to future genera-
tions their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accor-
dance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and
legal systems. 2
That definition alone arouses in any reader an array of socie-
tal, ideological and cultural perceptions. What is clear from
this definition is that preservation of tradition and culture are
of utmost concern to indigenous peoples. Yet, the interests of
the Westerners who surround and dominate them generally lie
in technological and cultural advancement, which tends to
breed an attitude of disregard and disrespect toward the past.
Thus, it is not only the appropriation of land and resources of
indigenous peoples by European colonizers, but the struggle to
maintain a traditional lifestyle and culture while the modern
world constantly encroaches, that is most problematic in the
eyes of natives.
For centuries, indigenous peoples were stripped of their
lands, sciences, ideas and cultures. The United States pro-
vides a good example. While invasive European explorers
pushed natives off of their land and claimed title to that land
for themselves,13 they deprived natives of many cultural items
deemed vital to tribal life:
Digging and removing the contents of Native American graves
for reasons of profit or curiosity has been common practice...
In 1868, the Surgeon General issued an order to all Army
field officers to send him Indian skeletons. This was done so
that studies could be performed to determine whether the In-
dian was inferior to the white man due to the size of the In-
12. Id.
13. The once widely recognized Discovery Doctrine justified the Europe-
ans' claim of title over lands formerly occupied by natives. See generally
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Johnson is an example of
how, during Colonial times, courts of law encouraged discrimination against
Native Americans by referring to them as "fierce savages, whose occupation
was war" and harbored the notion that European explorers who took posses-
sion of native property by force could attain good title, thereby relinquishing
any title natives might attempt to claim. Id. at 590.
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dian's cranium. This action, along with an attitude that ac-
cepted the desecration of countless Native American burial
sites, resulted in hundreds of thousands [sic] Native Ameri-
can human remains and funerary objects being sold or housed
in museums and educational institutions around the coun-
try.14
During the period of discovery from 1450-1600, as European
societies settled across the globe, they consistently disregarded
native peoples.1" During this era, territory inhabited by non-
European peoples was usually regarded as terra nullius.6 This
trend lasted long into the modern era.
A. Heritage Defined
To understand the language used to describe this movement
- the protection of indigenous heritage - is to understand
much about the substance and development of the movement
itself. Until very recently, the terms "cultural property" or "in-
tellectual property" were used to describe objects of cultural
importance to native peoples. It is now recognized that those
terms are too limited in their scope, and do not conform with
indigenous thought. The laws of indigenous groups vary
greatly, but one principle common to virtually all indigenous
groups is that of communal property rights.7 "Indigenous peo-
ples regard all products of the human mind and heart as inter-
related, and as flowing from the same source: the relationships
between the people and their land, their kinship with the other
living creatures that share the land, and with the spirit
world."18 The term international lawyers have agreed upon, in
order to give credence to this unique characterization, is "heri-
14. Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act, H.R. REP.
No. 877, at 10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4369 [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 877].
15. See Programme of Activities for the International Decade of the World's
Indigenous People, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), G.A. Res. 50/157, Annex, at Introduction (1995),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm [hereinafter Fact
Sheet No. 91.
16. MICHAEL B. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 145 (6th ed. 1987).




tage." 9 That term has been adopted'in all recent international
documentation on this subject. Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rap-
porteur of the Working Group, has developed a suitable defini-
tion:
"Heritage" is everything that belongs to the distinct identity
of a people and which is theirs to share, if they wish, with
other peoples. It includes all of those things which interna-
tional law regards as the creative production of human
thought and craftsmanship, such as songs, stories, scientific
knowledge and artworks. It also includes inheritances from
the past and from nature, such as human remains, the natu-
ral features of the landscape, and naturally-occurring species
of plants and animals with which a people has long been con-
nected.20
B. Justification for Protecting the Heritage of Indigenous Peo-
ples
The importance of protecting the heritage of indigenous peo-
ples can be justified on a number of levels. As one set of au-
thors has theorized:
From a utilitarian stand-point, the cultural heritage embodies
invaluable non-replicable information and data about the his-
toric and prehistoric story of humankind. Such information
may relate to the social, economic, cultural, environmental
and climatic conditions of past peoples, their evolving ecol-
ogies, adaptive strategies and early forms of environmental
management. The destruction of these storehouses of knowl-
edge, and the information contained in these libraries of life,
could critically affect how we respond to the continuing chal-
lenges of population growth, resource exhaustion, pollution,
21
and environmental management.
From an ethical standpoint, the destruction and abuse in-
digenous heritage has suffered at the hands of modern society
is simply unwarranted and merits reparation. As curiosity in
indigenous peoples' knowledge and cultures intensifies, exploi-
tation of those cultures increases. Areas occupied by indige-
nous people are utilized as tourist attractions; indigenous art
19. DAES, supra note 4, 23.
20. Id. 24.
21. Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 714.
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has become commercialized; indigenous medicinal knowledge
and expertise in agricultural biodiversity and environmental
management are used, but the profits are rarely shared with
indigenous peoples themselves.22 Such occurrences exemplify
unwarranted discrimination toward a sector of the community
whose cultural values and knowledge contribute greatly to the
global consciousness. If the world is to become a true global
community, all sectors of that community should be respected;
those who are dedicated to building such a community should
work toward this goal.
III. MOVING FROM STATE-CENTERED INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS TO A CUSTOMARY LAW OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
International law, traditionally concerned only with the
rights of "states,"23 has only recently taken a turn toward pro-
tecting individual human rights and toward protecting group
rights.24 Arguably, international law, as the concept has tradi-
tionally existed and to variable degrees exists today, is flawed,
as its emphasis on relations between states prevents groups
such as women and indigenous peoples, who claim no clear
boundaries or unifying government, from obtaining interna-
tional legal protection.25 Thus, the initial struggle for indige-
nous peoples was to be recognized as a group deserving protec-
tion of international law. Global recognition of indigenous peo-
ples is currently developing rather quickly. Numerous tribal
organizations have been formed worldwide, and have appealed
22. See Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 15, at Introduction.
23. The U.N. Charter deals solely with the obligations and rights of states.
See generally U.N. CHARTER. A state is defined as an entity which has a ter-
ritory, a government, a population, and enters into relations with other
states. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 202 (1987).
24. See generally Karen Knop, Why Rethinking the Sovereign State is Im-
portant for Women's International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (Rebecca J. Cook
ed., 1994).
25. See id. "The most far-reaching proposals for indigenous peoples favor
the recognition of all indigenous peoples as 'subjects of international law
competent to represent their interests in the international arena.'" Id. at 160
(quoting Maivan Clech Lam, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations:
Thoughts Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 603, 621 (1992)).
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to national and international governmental bodies to assist in
protecting their rights.26  The traditional state-based regime
persists, but as the structure of the United Nations evolves, it
has facilitated the development of group rights by means of
customary law. This is precisely what has occurred in regards
to the protection of indigenous heritage.
The movement's origin lies in four main state-centered inter-
national agreements: (1) the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
("Hague Convention");' (2) the 1970 United Nations Economic
and Social Council ("UNESCO") Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property ("1970 UNESCO
26. See Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 15, at Introduction. The sheer num-
ber of organizations currently representing indigenous groups demonstrates
just how far indigenous peoples have come in international law:
As of March 1997, 15 organizations of indigenous peoples have con-
sultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC). Consultative status entitles them to attend and con-
tribute to a wide range of international and intergovernmental con-
ferences. These organizations are: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Is-
lander Commission, Asociaci6n Kunas Unidos por Nabguana, Four
Directions Council, Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), Indian
Council of South America, Indian Law Resource Centre, Indigenous
World Association, International Indian Treaty Council, Interna-
tional Organization of Indigenous Resource Development, Inuit Cir-
cumpolar Conference, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Ser-
vices Secretariat, National Indian Youth Council, Saami Council, Se-
jekto Cultural Association of Costa Rica, and World Council of In-
digenous Peoples. In addition, hundreds of representatives of other
indigenous peoples and their organizations participate in United Na-
tions meetings, in particular those of the Working Group on Indige-
nous Populations. Non-governmental organizations with general
human rights interests actively contribute to work in the field of in-
digenous peoples' rights, in addition to supporting indigenous peo-
ples' causes.
Id.
27. Knopp, supra note 24, at 159-60.
28. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Conven-
tion].
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Convention");29 (3) the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
("1972 UNESCO Convention"); ° and (4) the International In-
stitute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") Con-
vention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
("UNIDROIT Convention").3' These agreements are signifi-
cantly limited, but they are nevertheless important, as they
have prompted the emergence of a customary international law
regarding the heritage of indigenous peoples.
A. State-Centered International Agreements
1. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention was drafted in response to the wide-
spread destruction of cultural entities resulting from the exten-
sive bombing and looting during World Wars I and II. It pre-
vents the purposeful destruction of cultural monuments, as
well as pillaging and vandalism of cultural objects, during
times of war.3 One important principle developed in the Con-
vention is that "damage to cultural property belonging to any
people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all
mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the cul-
ture of the world."34 However, the limited scope of the Hague
Convention - providing only for the protection of cultural ob-
jects during armed conflict, or during occupation of the terri-
tory of a signatory - effectively defeats the value of the con-
cept. 5
29. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 17,
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
30. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinaf-
ter 1972 UNESCO Convention].
31. Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
32. Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 725.
33. Hague Convention, supra note 28, art. 42.
34. Id. at pmbl.
35. Id. art. 18.
[Vol. X=VI:31114
1IDIGENO US PEOPLES
2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
The 1970 UNESCO Convention is recognized as tlie principle
document of UNESCO, the lead United Nations agency in the
field of cultural property.36 It provides two mechanisms for
states to protect objects of cultural importance: state parties
may request other states to place emergency import controls on
an object or class of objects," and may also request the return
of illegally-exported objects under certain conditions38
The Convention, described as "state-centric," 9 demonstrates
the apparent difficulty in utilizing traditional international
legal principles to meet the needs of distinctive groups such as
indigenous peoples. According to the provisions of the Conven-
tion, requests for the return of illegally-exported objects must
be made by a state, at its own expense.40 Therefore, indigenous
groups are forced to cross two impossible hurdles. First, they
must attain recognition from their mother state. Second, they
have the burden of convincing their mother state that it is
worth acting on their behalf and in furtherance of their inter-
ests. For indigenous peoples who are not recognized as legal
entities capable of owning property collectively or of bringing
legal actions in national courts, or who may lack the financial
means to pursue legal actions, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
is completely ineffective. 4' Furthermore, the Convention only
36. See DAES, supra note 4, 123.
37. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 9.
38. Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
39. Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 726.
40. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 7(b)(ii).
41. Most indigenous populations find it difficult even to receive recogni-
tion. For instance, "[miost Asian and African states deny that there are any
indigenous peoples within their territories. Bangladesh was subjected to con-
siderable pressure in the UN by the ILO before it would address the issue of
the Chittagong Hill People." Perkins, supra note 7. Furthermore:
The governments of France, Japan, Sweden, the United States and
other states have expressed strong misgivings about international
recognition of collective rights. Several states argue that their con-
stitutions do not permit the possibility of more than one "people"
within the national territory, and object to the use of such terms as
"indigenous nations," or in some cases to recognition of autonomous
indigenous legal and political systems.
Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples in International Law: A Constructiv-
ist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AMER. J. INT'L L. 414, 424 (1998).
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applies to objects removed after the Convention came into force
in both states.42 Thus, property lost prior to 1972, of which
there is a great deal, is afforded no protection.
3. The 1972 UNESCO Convention
The 1972 UNESCO Convention established the World Heri-
tage Committee43 to oversee the creation of a 'World Heritage
List."" States are required to submit to the Committee an in-
ventory of objects and sites important to their natural and cul-
tural heritage.45 The Committee then determines whether the
property meets the standard of having "outstanding universal
value," so as to be eligible for inclusion on the list." The inclu-
sion of a property in the World Heritage List requires the con-
sent of the state concerned.47 Thus, like its predecessor, the
1972 UNESCO Convention effectively excludes much of the
cultural property of indigenous peoples lacking recognition by
their nation state and discounts any rights indigenous peoples
wish to claim as a group.
4. The UNIDROIT Convention
The UNIDROIT Convention was drafted by the International
Institute for the Unification of Law, at the request of
UNESCO,48 for the purpose of furthering the 1970 UNESCO
Convention's goal of "regulating the transboundary movement
of cultural objects," and enhancing the earlier Convention's
effectiveness.49 It does not, however, improve on the state-
centric nature of its predecessor, and therefore bears minimal
significance to the rights of indigenous peoples."
Additionally, poorness is a trend throughout indigenous communities the
world over. See Press Release, supra note 7.
42. DAES, supra note 4, 124.
43. See 1972 UNESCO Convention, supra note 30, art. 8(1).
44. See id. art. 11.
45. Id.
46. See id. art. 11(2).
47. Id. art. 11(3).
48. See Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 727.
49. Id.
50. It will be noted, however, that the UNIDROIT Convention did declare
its concern with protecting from damage and illegal trade objects of signifi-
1116 [Vol. XXVII:3
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As demonstrated, indigenous peoples' rights will not be fully
served through such agreements. Custom, however, may be a
way to resolve that dilemma.
B. The Emergence of Custom
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") points to custom as one of the primary sources of inter-
national law.51 "Custom in international law is a practice fol-
lowed by those concerned because they feel legally obliged to
behave in such a way."52 Custom is created through the prac-
tice and opinion (opinio juris sive necessitates) of states,53 and
behavior by a state only contributes to custom where the state
acts out of a sense of legal obligation, rather than "out of mere
courtesy, convenience or tradition."54 "[Tihere is no precise
formula indicating how widespread a practice must be. What
in fact is of more importance than the number of states in-
volved is the attitude of those states whose interests are actu-
ally affected."5
It is the position of this Note that a customary international
law of indigenous peoples has developed, and that protection of
indigenous heritage is incorporated in its principles. The ILO
Convention No. 169,"6 ratified by fourteen states as of March 7,
2000,17 is a clear indication of the international community's
position regarding indigenous rights. The draft declaration,
studies and reports of the United Nations Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, although not formal treaties, add to
the existence of an international consensus. Finally, the prac-
tices of four major international players - Canada, New Zea-
land, Australia and the United States - in working to protect
cance to the heritage of "tribal" or "indigenous . . . communities." See
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, at pmbl.
51. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1153 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJI.
52. REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 9 (2d ed. 1992).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 11.
56. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 5.
57, See International Labour Organization, Ratification of Convention No.
C169, at http//ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited May 25,
2002).
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the heritage of their indigenous populations, further contribute
to customary law. It can be said that these states have acted
out of a sense of legal obligation, in light of the fact that most
have adopted international conventions concerning the issue
and are members of the United Nations. The subsequent por-
tion of this Note describes in further detail the ILO Convention
No. 169, the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples ("Draft Declaration") and the domestic laws
which collectively comprise the custom of indigenous peoples.
1. The ILO Convention No. 169
The ILO Convention No. 169, adopted in 1989, signifies a
"dynamic shift in state attitude toward the identity of indige-
nous peoples within the global community."8 Convention No.
169 was drafted in order to formally eradicate the old notion
that international law should work toward integration of in-
digenous peoples into the general population, as was formerly
promoted in its Convention No. 107 of 1957."9 Convention No.
169 is a final recognition that to attempt to assimilate indige-
nous peoples is not a workable solution, when the beliefs and
customs of such peoples are fully considered and understood.
This recognition was important for a number of reasons. It
represented a "greater understanding of [the position of in-
digenous and tribal peoples] by governments, employers and
workers.""0 It was also a significant step toward establishing
indigenous peoples' right to self-determination. The Conven-
tion provides: "Special measures shall be adopted as appropri-
ate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour,
cultures and environment of the peoples concerned,"61 and "[iun
applying the provisions of this Convention ... the social, cul-
tural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peo-
ples shall be recognized and protected."62 Although the Con-
vention does not expressly address cultural property protection,
58. Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 729.
59. International Labor Organization Convention (No. 107) Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, 328
U.N.T.S. 247.
60. See id. at pmbl.
61. Id. art. 4(1).
62. Id. art. 5(a).
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it has been interpreted as a safeguard for the heritage of in-
digenous peoples.' It can be read so as to impose upon nation
states an affirmative duty to adopt measures for protecting in-
digenous heritage.
The ILO Convention No. 169 is an important link in the
emergence of international custom regarding the protection of
the heritage of indigenous peoples. It affords broad, arguably
vague propositions, but it is undeniably the one international
legal document that is most truly concerned with protecting the
rights of indigenous peoples. Moreover, it incorporates the rec-
ommendations of indigenous organizations."
2. The Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions was established in 1982 by the U.N. Human Rights
Commission ("Commission") and the Economic and Social
Council, on the recommendation of the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.6 It was at the
request of Australia, Canada and several indigenous organiza-
tions in 1984, that the Commission decided to focus on drafting
a set of "international standards based on a continued and
comprehensive review of... the situations and aspirations of
indigenous populations throughout the world."66
In 1988, the Working Group began composing a draft decla-
ration on the rights of indigenous peoples,67 which, after nu-
merous revisions, was finalized in 1993.68 The Draft Declara-
tion has been described as "the most important development
63. See Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 730.
64. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 5, at pmbl. The Inter-
American Institute was involved in the creation of the Convention. Id.
65. See E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.
Doc. E/RES/1982/82 (1982).
66. Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 15, at Introduction; Russel Lawrence
Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM.
J. Ift'L L. 369, 372 (1986).
67. See Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 15, at Introduction.
68. See Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 731.
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concerning the protection of the basic rights and fundamental
freedoms of Indigenous Peoples." 9
Substantively, the Draft Declaration grants a broad range of
rights to indigenous peoples - land rights, economic rights,
educational rights, cultural rights, political rights, the right to
protection in times of armed conflict and the right to self-
determination.7" Most notably, it calls upon states to respect
indigenous peoples as a unique sector of society,7' while grant-
ing them the right to equal enjoyment of the law of nations72
and the right to be free from discrimination.73 Finally, the
Draft Declaration affirms indigenous peoples' right to "practise
and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs," including
the right to "maintain, protect and develop the past, present
and future manifestations of their cultures;"74 to "dignity and
diversity of their cultures;"7 and to "maintain and strengthen
their distinctive spiritual and material relationship" with the
lands and waters which they have traditionally inhabited or
utilized.76
While the Declaration is not a binding legal document, but is
merely a recommendation to member states, it nevertheless
carries significant weight as evidence of international custom.
Although a resolution of an international organization "is never
conclusive evidence of customary law,"77 it does have "consider-
able moral force."78 Further, it is sound evidence of the opinio
juris of the fifty-three member states of the Commission who
approved it. 7 The Draft Declaration and other reports and
69. Erica-Irene Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples under the Auspicies
of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 7
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 493, 493 (1995).
70. See Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
71. Id. at pmbl.
72. See id. art. 1.
73. See id. art. 2.
74. Id. art. 12.
75. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, art. 16 (emphasis added).
76. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
77. AKEHURST, supra note 16, at 27.
78. WALLACE, supra note 52, at 29. See also Guruswamy et al., supra note
3, at 732 ('The interactive, global process of drafting the Declaration has led
to the further crystallization of expectations and international norms.").
79. WALLACE, supra note 52, at 30 ("[Voting within an international or-
ganisation may be a useful link in the international law-making process, that
is, it may provide the evidence necessary for 'law' to be attributed to usage.");
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studies of the Working Group, being "teachings of the most
highly 4ualified publicists of the various nations," constitute,
and are consistently used as, a subsidiary means for determin-
ing the law in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ.80 It is important to note that the declarations and reports
of the Working Group are created in consideration of submis-
sions by indigenous organizations. The Working Group, and
therefore the U.N. and its member states8' have implicitly ac-
knowledged indigenous peoples as a group deserving of rights
as such under international law. The Draft Declaration was
recently reviewed and revised by a conference of experts, gov-
ernment officials, indigenous organizations and intergovern-
mental organizations at a United Nations seminar held in Ge-
neva from February 28 to March 1, 2000.2 The presence of
government officials at such a meeting is further evidence of
opinio juris.
3. The Contributions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada
Customary international law is, in substantial part, derived
from the domestic practices of nations.' A few countries, the
United States among them, have made substantial efforts to
protect the heritage of their indigenous populations.' Austra-
lia, New Zealand and Canada have also instilled within their
legal systems comprehensive protection.85
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, at http'//www.unhchr.cb/
htmllmenu2/2/chr.htm (last visited May 29, 2002).
80. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 51, art. 38(d); WALLACE, supra note 52,
at 27-28.
81. The United States is one of the founding members of the United Na-
tions. See U.N. CHARTER.
82. U.N. ESCOR, 52nd Sess., 26th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26
(2000). The purpose of bringing these various concerned groups together was
to hear the range of viewpoints, and explore areas of contention and areas of
disagreement, in order to ultimately come closer to internationally agreeable
standards and communally acceptable language. Id.
83. AHEHURST, supra note 16, at 25-26.
84. See Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 733.
85. Id.
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a. Australia (Aborigines)
Australia has extensive measures to protect the heritage of
its indigenous population, the Aborigines.86 As early as 1906,
an ethnological committee was established in New South Wales
to study export control of Aboriginal materials.87 By 1913, Abo-
riginal cultural objects were subject to federal customs con-
trols.88 When the Australian government consulted the Abo-
rigines regarding the export of Aboriginal items, they discov-
ered that Aborigines were just as concerned about the move-
ment of Aboriginal objects within Australia as they were with
those objects subject to international exchange.89 In response
to that concern, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heri-
tage Protection Act was passed in 1984.90 The Act states as its
goal "the preservation and protection from injury or desecra-
tion of areas and objects in Australia and in Australian waters,
being areas and objects that are of particular significance to
Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition."91 The Act
grants the Minister of the Commonwealth the power to evalu-
ate applications made by an Aboriginal tribe seeking to pre-
serve or protect an object, class or objects, area of land or re-
mains of significance to aboriginal tradition, and to declare an
area or object protected.92 As of 1988, only four out of fifty-
seven applications submitted under the Act were granted.93
86. "Aborigine' means inhabitant of Australia in pre-historic ages or a
descendant from any such person." Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics
Preservation Act, 1972, c. 8273, § 2 (Austl.). Aborigines have inhabited Aus-
tralia for as long as 60,000 years. Theresa Simpson, Claims of Indigenous
Peoples to Cultural Property in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 204 (1994).
87. See Simpson, supra note 86, at 205.
88. See id. The Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, passed two
years later in 1986, is the current legislation governing international export
of indigenous property. Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986, c.
11 (Austl.). It prevents export of the "movable cultural heritage of Australia"
without a permit. Id.
89. Id. at 205-06.
90. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984, c.
79 (Austl.).
91. Id. § 4.
92. Id. §§ 9-12.
93. Simpson, supra note 86, at 206. Most Australian states have also
instilled legislation to protect Aboriginal heritage within state borders. One
example is Victoria's Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act,
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Australian courts have also worked to protect Aboriginal
heritage. A recent decision by the High Court of Australia took
an unexpected turn and afforded the Aborigines common law
protection of communal land rights. In Mabo v. Queensland,
the court held that "native title" (Aboriginal title) pre-dates the
British colonization of Australia, and continues to exist, quali-
fying it for protection under available common law remedies."
This holding challenged the traditional notion that all native
title to land had been eradicated at the moment of European
occupation.95 The court further noted that native land is usu-
ally communal, but that the communal nature of the land
would not affect the common law rights and remedies belong-
ing to those with "native title."96 The Mabo decision has been
interpreted to extend common law property rights not only to
native land, but to objects of Aboriginal heritage.97 However,
the Native Title Act, passed in 1993 to codify the court's deci-
sion in Mabo, only refers to land rights.98
More recent successes for the Aboriginal peoples include: the
creation of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Heritage Studies; an order by the government
to return the Crowther Collection (an array of skeletal re-
mains) to the aboriginal community; and the delegation of
management authority of the Uluru National Park to the Abo-
rigines.99
b. New Zealand (Maori)
As early as 1840, New Zealand entered into an agreement
with the native Maori people. Under the agreement, known as
the Treaty of Waitangi, the state ceded all rights of sovereignty
to the Queen of England, while guaranteeing to the Maori "the
full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and
1972, c. 8273 (Austl.), which provides for the designation of "archeological
areas," in order to preserve "unique and irreplaceable relics," from destruc-
tion, damage, removal or interference. Id. §§ 15-19. Such relics, ironically,
are deemed the property of the Crown. Id. § 20.
94. Mabo v. Queensland [No. 21 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 57, 61-2.
95. See id. at 46.
96. Id. at 61-62.
97. See Simpson, supra note 86, at 209 n.102.
98. Native Title Act, 1993, c. 110 (Austl.).
99. See Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 735-36.
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estates, forests, fisheries, and other properties which they may
collectively or individually possess.""0 The broad language of
the Treaty appears to grant the Maori the right to control any
land, objects or intangibles relating their heritage as a whole.
For a time, however, New Zealand courts refused to give force
to the Treaty in this manner, denying to the Maori any legal
title in land.' Even so, that agreement is still recognized as
the basis of all relations between the Maori and its mother
state. '2 Recently, the legislature and courts of New Zealand
have been more willing to accept the validity of the Treaty, and
the government has made significant efforts, both nationally
and internationally, to repatriate Maori cultural artifacts.'0 3
The Antiquities Act of 1975 instructs any person who finds an
artifact anywhere in New Zealand to notify either the Secre-
tary or the nearest public museum, which is to then notify the
Secretary.' Once the Secretary has been informed of a discov-
ery, she places the decision of ownership in the hands of the
Maori Land Court. 0 5
In recognition of the Maori's deeply spiritual view of the en-
vironment, the government has conferred to the Maori a major
role in New Zealand's Green Plan and Resource Management
Act ("RMA"). 06 The RMA gives Maori leaders significant input
into environmental policies and plans, as well as guarantees
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.0 7
100. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, Eng.-Maori, arts. I-II, 89 Consol. T.S.
473-75, available at http'//www.govt.nz/aboutnz/treaty.php3.
101. See Simpson, supra note 86, at 215.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 215-18. One example of such an effort was the New Zealand
government's action on behalf of the Maori people to repatriate a tattooed
head just as it was about to be auctioned in London. The New Zealand gov-
ernment successfully made a deal with the owner to return the head to the
Maori people in order to receive a proper burial in accordance with Maori law
and custom. Id. at 216-17.
104. Antiquities Act, 1975, c. 41, § 11(3) (N.Z.).
105. Id. § 12.
106. Resource Management Act, 1991, c. 69 (N.Z.); Hayley Nelson, Maori
Principles and New Zealand's Resource Management Act, THE INTERNATIONAL
GREEN PLANNER (The Resource Renewal Institute, San Francisco, CA), Spring
1995, at 7, available at http://www.rri.org/newsletters/newssp95/mori.html.
107. See Resource Management Act, at tit. 8; Nelson, supra note 106.
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c. Canada (Canadian Indians)
Similar, but somewhat more limited actions have been taken
by Canada to pr6tect the heritage of its Indian population. The
1970 Indian Act places restrictions on items relating to indige-
nous heritage discovered on historic sites and native reserves,
but written consent from the government is needed to transfer
title of such objects.0 8
Prior to 1992, Canada refused to recognize the sovereign
status of indigenous peoples.'0 9 A breakthrough occurred in
1992, when a plebiscite approved the division of the Northwest
territories into Eastern and Western portions. ° The agree-
ment, effective as of April 1, 1999, established in the Eastern
portion a "Nunavut," (Eskimo for "our land") as a separate and
distinct territory."'
The actions of these countries demonstrate an international
effort to protect and preserve indigenous heritage. When
woven together with international treaties and declarations of
the U.N. Working Group, an "unmistakable tapestry displaying
the cultural protection of indigenous peoples" is created.
112
Whereas the United States was once leading the movement
toward protection of the heritage of indigenous peoples, it has
now fallen behind. In order for the U.S. to regain its momen-
tum, it must reevaluate its stance towards indigenous peoples.
What follows is a historical overview of the development of con-
cern for the heritage of our native population, and an analysis
of which "customs" found their origination in the laws of the
U.S. This section concludes by highlighting the major princi-
ples which govern the protection of the heritage of indigenous
peoples, and then evaluating those areas where the United
States needs to consider further action, in order to comply with
those principles.
108. Indian Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-5 (1970) (Can.).
109. Simpson, supra note 86, at 210.
110. See John Amagoalik, The New Territory of Nunavut, in NUNAvuT
HANDBOOK 103 (1999), available at http'J/www.arctictravel.com/chap-
ters/territorypage.html.
111. Nunavut Act, 1993, ch. 28, 1993 S.C. 1187 (Can.).
112. Guruswamy et al., supra note 3, at 737.
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C. Efforts in the United States (Native American Indians, Na-
tive Hawaiians and Native Alaskans)
1. Historical Overview
When it came to historic and cultural preservation, the
United States was slow to act."' At the turn of the twentieth
century, the federal government recognized that certain sites
and monuments merited protection of the law. In response to
vandalism at the Casa Grande ruins in Arizona, and in an at-
tempt to preserve Mt. Vernon in Virginia, Congress passed the
Antiquities Act of 1906."' It gave the President the power to
declare national monuments, and conferred upon the federal
government the ability to reserve as much control over such
monuments or sites as needed "for the[ir] proper care and
management.""5 It further imposed fines and possible impris-
onment upon "any person who appropriate[s], excavate[s], in-
jure[s], or destroy[s] any historic or prehistoric ruin or monu-
ment, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or
controlled by the [U.S. government], without permission from
the Secretary of the Department of the Government having
jurisdiction over the lands.""6
Over the next sixty years, Congress passed several additional
acts dealing with the preservation of historic sites and objects
of historic significance. For example, the 1935 Historic Sites,
Buildings and Antiquities Act" provided for the creation of the
National Trust for Historical Preservation;.. and the NationalHistoric Preservation Act, in 1966, provided for a National Reg-
113. Although, a movement was started during the nineteenth century to
save some historic treasures. See Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws
Protecting our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 63, 63, 66 (1993).
114. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1457, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6378, 6380;
Phelan, supra note 113, at 67.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 431.
116. Id. § 433.
117. Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-67
(2000). The Act declared a national policy "to preserve for public use historic
sites, buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration and
benefit of the people of the United States." Id. § 461.
118. See 16 U.S.C. § 468 (2000). The National Trust is instructed to "re-
ceive donations of sites, buildings, and objects significant to American history
and culture," and "to preserve and administer them for public benefit." Id.
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ister, to record objects and sites of historical, scientific and cul-
tural significance and to formulate a means of enforcing na-
tionally the 1972 UNESCO Convention.1 9 In 1985, the Com-
mission for the Preservation of America's Heritage Abroad 121
was established to identify and publish a list of those foreign
cemeteries, monuments and historic buildings associated witlh
the ancestral heritage of U.S. citizens hailing from Eastern and
Central Europe, and to receive assurances from foreign gov-
ernments that the identified sites will be preserved and pro-
tected.
121
While these acts represent a concern for the preservation of
the nation's ancestral and cultural history overall, they are
significantly limited. For one, they ignore the need to protect
and preserve those items existing in the United States that are
of cultural importance to foreign nations. Second, they bear no
response to the Native American population's earnest request
to treat the objects of their cultural heritage uniquely and to
recognize them as a distinct cultural entity within America."
While the acts mentioned above certainly apply to Native
American soil, and therefore have in some cases served to pro-
vide protection for their own antiquities," those laws failed to
give them positive rights to, and the desired control over their
heritage, whether or not it was covered under those acts. But
why would they be concerned with protecting objects of impor-
tance to their heritage, when most of those objects were safe
within the glass enclosures of the nation's museums?
2. The Role of Museums
On the one hand, museums served to protect many Native
American cultural and religious objects and artwork from the
hands of zealous missionaries who confiscated and destroyed
"heathen" symbols during periods in which the federal govern-
119. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (2000).
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to periodically nominate properties of
international significance to the World Heritage Committee on behalf of the
United States. Id. § 470a-1.
120. 16 U.S.C. § 469 (2000).
121. 16 U.S.C. § 469j; Phelan, supra note 113, at 79.
122. The term "Native American" or "natives" is used herein to include
Native American Indians, Native Hawaiians and Native Alaskans.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ment attempted to assimilate Native Americans into the cul-
tural mainstream."M On the other hand, museums often mis-
represented Native American culture by improperly displaying
or mishandling artifacts; skeletons and sacred objects were of-
ten displayed without consent; and museums often refused to
return ceremonial objects to tribes that claimed ownership.
Furthermore, it was possible for museums to acquire objects
sold by an individual against the wishes of the tribe, or that
were stolen from the tribe or obtained by excavation of private
lands.125 The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978
specifically addressed these issues.26 It directed the President
to consult native traditional religious leaders in order to evalu-
ate federal policies and procedures and to come up with rec-
ommendations for legislative action regarding the preservation
of Native American religious cultural practices.2  However,
few, if any, of those recommendations were implemented. 8
This is one dilemma which the Native American Graves Protec-
tion and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA") served to resolve. 29
3. NAGPRA
Not until 1990, with the passing of NAGPRA, did Congress
take the important step of formally recognizing the Native
124. Walter Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for
Assessing Competing Legal interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437, 438-39 (1986).
125. Id. at 444-45. Daes notes that not all objects are of great enough im-
portance that they deserve repatriation. At a minimum, indigenous groups to
whom such objects derive should have a say as to how those objects are dis-
played in museums. "Museums are a major factor in forming public percep-
tions of the nature, value and contemporary vitality of indigenous cultures.
Indigenous peoples rightly believe that museum collections and displays
should be used to strengthen respect for their identity and cultures, rather
than being used to justify colonialism or dispossession." DAES, supra note 4,
$56.
126. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(Supp. V 1999).
127. Id.
128. See Echo-Hawk, supra note 124, at 439; Dean B. Suagee, American
Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting
Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1982).




American culture as unique.' NAGPRA is distinct in that the
natives themselves were consulted and given significant input
into the formulation of the Act.'' Under the Act, natives retain
considerable control over items which they deem culturally
significant.
13 2
NAGPRA serves two main objectives.13 The first is to protect
Native American "human remains, funerary objects, sacred
objects and objects of cultural patrimony which are excavated
or removed from Federal or tribal lands after the enactment of
the Act."" If any such items are found, and are known to be
closely related to a particular native tribe, that tribe must be
contacted and given an opportunity to reclaim the item.135 Fur-
thermore, those who engage in mining, construction or logging,
and who find any such items incidentally in the course of their
work, must make a diligent effort to protect them.
136
As its second main objective, NAGPRA provides for Native
American or Native Hawaiian tribes to attain control over
those human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects and ob-
130. In 1979, Congress passed legislation which referred directly to native
lands, however that act merely protects "archaeological resources," the defini-
tion of which is severely limited. See Archaeological Resources Protection
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm, 470bb(1) (2000).
131. Congress recognized that the act reflects a "unique relationship be-
tween the Federal government and Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian or-
ganizations." 25 U.S.C. § 3010. At a legislative hearing on July 17, 1990,
held by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to whom the
bill was referred, testimony was presented by Indian organizations, Tribal
religious leaders, and Native Hawaiian representatives, among representa-
tives of museums, archaeologists, private art dealers and professional scien-
tific and museum associations. See H.R. REP. No. 877, supra note 14, at 12-
13. NAGPRA calls for the establishment of a Review Committee "to monitor
and review the implementation of the inventory and identification process
and repatriation activities required under sections 3003, 3004 and 3005 of
[the Act]." 25 U.S.C. § 3006(a). The committee is comprised of seven mem-
bers, three of whom are selected from those nominated by "Indian tribes,
Native Hawaiian organizations, and traditional Native American religious
leaders with at least 2 of such persons being traditional Indian religious
leaders." Id. § 3006(b)(1)(a).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
133. H.R. REP. No. 877, supra note 14, at 9.
134. Id.
135. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act § 3005, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (2000).
136. Id. § 3002(d)(1).
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jects of cultural patrimony associated with their tribe, which
are currently held and controlled by federal agencies and mu-
seums.'37 Museums are ordered to take an inventory of all such
items, to contact the tribes associated with the items and to
meet with natives in order to come to an agreement as to the
future handling and treatment of the items in question.'38
IV. PRINCIPLES OF A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED TO U. S. LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE HERITAGE OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
A. The Principles Composing the Customary International Law
of the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples
The U.N. Draft Declaration, studies of the Working Group,
the ILO Convention No. 169 and the practice of states collec-
tively define a new set of principles governing the protection of
the heritage of indigenous peoples. Since it is a relatively new
international topic, custom continues to develop in this area.
However, three major principles predominate: (1) respect for
indigenous peoples' own laws; (2) indigenous peoples' right to
repatriation of and control over their heritage; and (3) indige-
nous peoples' right to be free from discrimination. Naturally,
these principles are interrelated - individually their signifi-
cance is minimal; collectively they carry great weight. The
principle of self-determination obliges the government to allow
each tribe to interpret its own system of laws;"3 9 thus, the prin-
ciples of native law, including the concept of community prop-
erty, should determine when and with whom indigenous heri-
tage can be shared.
The idea of control is so important because it is in line with
the way indigenous peoples define ownership.' ° Each indige-
nous tribe has a particular set of intricate laws regarding the
137. H.R. REP. No. 877, supra note 14, at 9.
138. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3003-05.
139. See generally ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 5; Draft Declara-
tion, supra note 5.
140. Indigenous peoples maintain "the right to enjoy and use certain ele-
ments of its heritage, under its own laws and procedures," but "always re-
serve a perpetual right to determine how shared knowledge is used. This
continuing, collective right to manage heritage is critical to the identity, sur-
vival and development of each indigenous society." DAES, supra note 4, 30.
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ownership of their heritage; but on the whole, indigenous peo-
ples abide by the principle of communal property.' Heritage
as a communal right is therefore associated not with an indi-
vidual, but with a family, clan or tribe. The communal entity,
rather than any particular individual, must consent to the
sharing of heritage. The conveyors and beneficiaries of com-
munal property assume the following roles: the conveyors al-
ways maintain both the right to revoke it and the authority to
ensure that the beneficiary makes proper use of it, while the
beneficiary continues to "recognize and repay the gift."
4 3
Indigenous peoples have been afforded the "full and effective
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms rec-
ognized in the Charter of the United Nations and in interna-
tional human rights law."'" One major tenet of international
human rights law is that of freedom from discrimination.'"
Thus, it is contrary to international legal principles to dis-
criminate based on a people's indigenous origin or identity.46
Included in this right, is the right of indigenous peoples to re-
ceive equal protection of the law.
B. Where the U.S. Falls Short in its Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples
NAGPRA is a major contribution to legal protection of in-
digenous heritage, yet it is underinclusive in its application.
Non-federal institutions such as art auction houses, dealers
and private collectors are not bound by the Act.147 Take, for
example, the case of a gold miner who, in 1908, came into pos-
session of two mummies from Inupiat territory in Alaska and
displayed them for years as part of a traveling curiosity show.
48
141. See id. 27-28.
142. Id. 28.
143. Id.
144. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, art. 1.
145. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (HI), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948).
146. See Draft Declaration, supra note 5, art. 2.
147. See Kate Morris, Strategies and Procedures for the Repatriation of
Materials from the Private Sector, in MENDING THE CIRCLE: A NATIVE
A vaucAF REPATRIATION GUIDE (1997), available at
http//www.repatriationfoundation.org/strat.html.
148. See DAES, supra note 4, 48.
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He eventually returned the bodies out of his own good will, but
149
neither he nor his family had any legal obligation to do so.
The American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation Foundation is
particularly concerned with this issue, and it offers guidance as
to how native groups might utilize alternative means to repa-
triate items of cultural or religious significance from non-
federal entities.150 Although these requests are sometimes suc-
cessful, federal legislation is necessary to ensure uniform and
consistent repatriation of items of heritage moving within the
private sector.
The U.S. offers inadequate legal protection of native lands.
Laws do not prevent the government from disposing of native
land/sites or of utilizing those lands for purposes inconsistent
with native traditions and beliefs. 5' For example, the Historic
Sites Act grants the federal government the power to acquire
by eminent domain or otherwise sites of national historic sig-
nificance, when it determines that preservation is necessary "to
commemorate and illustrate the nation's history.""2 Thus, the
government has reserved for itself the right to confiscate lands
and sites which sit upon native land, and to decide upon the
appropriate use of such sites. Often such sites are of sacred
importance to natives, and they object to the intrusion of other
upon such sites and/or to the manner for which it is used by the
public (i.e., tourism), which may infringe upon their sacred or
religious exercises.153 Such actions show disregard for the
149. See id. The mummies were then reburied in accordance with the be-
liefs of Inupiat people. Id.
150. See Morris, supra note 147.
151. See DAES, supra note 4, 36-37.
152. Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 462(d)
(2000). See, e.g., Barnidge v. United States., 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939);
Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 849 (E.D. Va.
1980) ("Designation [as a historic landmark] also makes the District a proper
subject under the 1935 Act for acquisition by the federal government, includ-
ing acquisition by eminent domain.").
153. See DAES, supra note 4, at 1$ 5-6. In numerous instances U.S. courts
have refused to protect Native Americans' spiritual and religious lands from
intrusion by the government. See, e.g., Morongo Bank of Mission Indians v.
Fed. Aviation Admin. 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to review a Fed-
eral Aviation Administration decision to create an airline arrival route which
would pass directly over Morongo Reservation lands); New Mexico Navajo
Ranchers Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (upholding Interstate Commerce Commission's decision to allow con-
1132 [Vol. XXVII:3
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
strong spiritual ties natives share with their land. Applying
the basic principles of international custom, the government
should, at a minimum, be required to consult with the indige-
nous population regarding such actions.'
The issue of equal protection of the laws most commonly
arises in regards to protecting the intellectual property rights
of natives. Whereas the state has constructed laws to generally
protect creators and inventors, those laws have not been ap-
plied equally where the native population is concerned. For
example, the scope of NAGPRA is limited to "funerary objects"
and "human remains."155 The broad definition of heritage and
the principle of communal property require that the concepts of
repatriation and control be extended to other types of heritage,
including artworks, handicrafts, Indian symbols, medicinal
knowledge, performing arts and advertising.
U.S. legislation inadequately protects indigenous arts and
crafts, originating locally and abroad. There is a large and ac-
tive market for the trade of indigenous artworks and handi-
crafts, dominated by large-scale importers such as Pier One.'56
Those importers sell handicrafts at three to seven times the
prices they pay to the producers.'57 On the local level, the In-
dian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 offers some protection of Na-
tive American arts and crafts, by authorizing the Arts and
Crafts Board to register trade marks for individual artists, as
well as tribes and indigenous organizations. 5 8 Further, the Act
makes it a crime to sell a product as "Indian" unless it was ac-
struction and operation of a railroad, for the purpose of coal mining, upon
sacred Navajo lands); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding
that to build a skiing facility upon fifty acres of Hopi and Navajo sacred
mountains would not severely infringe upon the Natives' religious freedom);
Fools Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing the government
to create a tourist site by constructing trails and parking lots on Bear Butte
in South Dakota - the Sioux's most sacred mountain). But ef Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Bank of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (upholding an
1837 treaty, by which the Chippewa tribes ceded lands to the U.S. govern-
ment in exchange for the right to "hunt, fish and gather wild rice" upon those
lands, now part of Wisconsin and Minnesota).
154. See DAEs, supra note 4, 1 37.
155. See generally Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (2000).
156. See DAEs, supra note 4, 59-60.
157. Id.
158. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
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tually produced by a member of a state or federally recognized
Indian tribe.'59 However, over 100 tribes lack official recogni-
tion by the government - members of those tribes are not cov-
ered by the legislation and therefore are subject to imprison-
ment if they identify their artwork as "Indian."
160
Further problems exist regarding the incorporation of native
art images and designs into "modern" artworks.' Such incor-
poration often results in misinterpretations and negative
stereotypes. 62 One means of resolving this problem is to
amend copyright laws so as to incorporate the principle of
community rights. Specifically, the law should provide protec-
tion in conformity with the native belief that the sale of a work
of art does not terminate the interests of the communities
whose traditional motifs have been employed by the artist.
6 3
At a minimum, artists who wish to incorporate indigenous
symbols into their artwork should be required to consult the
tribe with which the symbol is associated, in order to assure
that the artwork does not offend native custom or belief.
Similar issues arise in regards to the non-artistic use of "In-
dian" logos. Natives find offensive the use of their name on
commercial items such as automobiles (e.g., the "Cherokee").
They likewise resent the use of Native names for sports teams
(e.g., "Redskins") and mascots and the imitation of "Indian
warriors" by such mascots, which they perceive as mockery of
their culture.' Such behavior is discriminatory and disre-
159. Id. § 305(d).
160. See DAES, supra note 4, T1 64. For a list of those tribes recognized by
the federal government, see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Re-
ceive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fed. Reg.
13,298, 13,298-303 (Mar. 13, 2000). The 2000 amendment to the Indian Arts
and Craft Act does not alter the definition of "Indian." Indian Arts and
Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-497, 114 Stat. 2219 (2000)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)). It does, however, contain
the following provision: "[Tihe Board shall promulgate regulations to include
in the definition of the term 'Indian product' specific examples of such prod-
uct to provide guidance to Indian artisans as well as to purveyors and con-
sumers of Indian arts and crafts, as defined under this Act." Id. § 2(4).
161. See DAES, supra note 4, 91 68.
162. Id.
163. Id. 91 70.
164. Barbara Munson, Common Themes and Questions About the Use of




spectful of indigenous culture. Even though action by the fed-
eral government in this area appears to be unlikely, certain
types of regional laws, such as non-discrimination policies, may
be effective in minimizing inappropriate use of native logos."
Another area of concern to indigenous peoples is federally
funded advertising. The government will often feature natives
in advertising designed to attract tourists from overseas, ne-
glecting to request permission for use of such images.'66 Nor
are natives given the opportunity to reap any benefit from the
resulting increase in tourism.167 In this regard, natives are be-
ing discriminated against and are denied equal protection of
the laws.
Yet another illustration of where U.S. law does not comply
with international standards is in its treatment of foreign in-
digenous heritage. The United States continues to be one of
the world's largest consumers of heritage that has its origins in
foreign indigenous communities, for which it offers little pro-
tection.'68 The international standards call for recognition and
protection of the rights of indigenous peoples as an interna-
tional group. Therefore, the U.S. has an obligation to direct
museums and collectors who hold items of foreign indigenous
heritage to contact the groups to whom such heritage belongs
and to repatriate such items, if the indigenous group so re-
quests.
Finally, when it comes to the use of traditional indigenous
knowledge in the creation of new medicines, the U.S. has ig-
nored the basic rights of indigenous peoples. 6 9 Due to the great
165. All Wisconsin public schools are required to have a non-discrimination
policy and are required to provide education about Wisconsin's native peo-
ples. The objective of such legislation is to promote cultural sensitivity and
awareness in the community. Id.
166. See DAES, supra note 4, 88.
167. Id.
168. See id. 33. The United States is a party to the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention as well as the 1972 UNESCO Convention, however, the U.S. has
refused to ratify the more recent UNIDROIT Convention, because its defini-
tions of ownership conflict with U.S. property law. See International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law (UNDROIT): Final Act of the Diplo-
matic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the
International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 23
I.L.M. 1322, 1323 (1995) (Introductory Note by Harold S. Burman).
169. See DAES, supra note 4, 90-102.
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difficulty in discovering and obtaining medicines in nature, the
U.S. utilizes traditional knowledge to focus in on which plant
species are to be screened for use in the creation of new medi-
cines.' Many of the plants utilized for the manufacturing of
drugs, a billion dollar business in the U.S., are retrieved from
foreign indigenous peoples (e.g., the traditional healers of
Madagascar); no credit or compensation is given to the those
who originally revealed the healing powers of such plants. 7'
Overall, improving U.S. protection for the heritage of indige-
nous peoples involves integration of the concept of communal
property into the legal system. Specifically, it means sacrific-
ing, to some degree, the modern view that property is an indi-
vidual right, belonging solely to those who can make the most
economical and efficient use of an idea, physical object or area
of land.
V. CONCLUSION
Indigenous peoples perform a unique role in today's society, a
role which is generally under appreciated. But as we look to-
ward the future, many answers are to be found in the past.
Fostering dignity and respect for native cultural practices, be-
liefs and knowledge is an important step toward building a co-
hesive global community. International recognition of the need
to protect indigenous heritage is an important move in that
direction. The United States should, for this reason, work to
improve its position towards indigenous peoples. Indigenous
peoples need not be left in the past; they are an integral part of
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